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Since entering the linguistic stage in the late sixties, Davidsonian event semantics has taken 
on an important role in linguistic theorizing. Davidson’s (1967) central claim is that events 
are spatiotemporal things, i.e., concrete particulars with a location in space and time. This 
enrichment of the underlying ontology has proven to be of great benefi t in explaining 
numerous combinatorial and inferential properties of natural language expressions. This 
article will trace the motivation, development, and applications of event semantics during 
the past decades and provide a picture of current views on the role of events in natural 
language meaning. Besides introducing the classical Davidsonian paradigm and providing 
an ontological characterization of events, the article discusses the Neo-Davidsonian turn 
with its broader perspective on eventualities and the use of thematic roles and/or decom-
positional approaches. Further topics are the stage-level/individual-level distinction, the 
somewhat murky category of states and some results of recent psycholinguistic studies that 
have tested the insights of Davidsonian event semantics.
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1. Introduction
Since entering the linguistic stage in the late sixties, Davidsonian event semantics has 
taken on an important role in linguistic theorizing. The central claim of Donald David-
son’s seminal (1967) work “The logical form of action sentences” is that events are 
spatiotemporal things, i.e., concrete particulars with a location in space and time. This 
enrichment of the underlying ontology has proven to be of great benefi t in explaining 
numerous combinatorial and inferential properties of natural language expressions. 
Most prominent among the many remarkable advances achieved within the Davidsonian 
paradigm since then have been the progress made in the theoretical description of verb 
semantics, including tense and aspect, and the breakthrough in analyzing adverbial modi-
fi cation. Numerous monographs and collections attest to the extraordinary fruitfulness 
of the Davidsonian program; see, e.g., Rothstein (1998), Tenny & Pustejovsky (2000), 
Higginbotham, Pianesi & Varzi (2000), Lang, Maienborn & Fabricius-Hansen (2003), 
Austin, Engelberg & Rauh (2004), Maienborn & Wöllstein (2005), Dölling, Heyde-
Zybatov & Schäfer (2008) to mention just a few collections from the last decade.
In the course of the evolution of the Davidsonian paradigm, two moves have turned 
out to be particularly infl uential in terms of expanding and giving new direction to this 
overall approach. These are, fi rst, the “Neo-Davidsonian turn” initiated by Higginbo-
tham (1985, 2000) and Parsons (1990, 2000), and, secondly, Kratzer’s (1995) merger of 
event semantics with the stage-level/individual-level distinction.
The Neo-Davidsonian approach has lately developed into a kind of standard for event 
semantics. It is basically characterized by two largely independent assumptions. The fi rst 
assumption concerns the arity of verbal predicates. While Davidson introduced event 
arguments as an additional argument of (some) verbs, Neo-Davidsonian accounts take 
the event argument of a verbal predicate to be its only argument. The relation between 
events and their participants is accounted for by the use of thematic roles. The second 
Neo-Davidsonian assumption concerns the distribution of event arguments: they are 
considered to be much more widespread than originally envisaged by Davidson. That 
is, Neo-Davidsonian approaches typically assume that it is not only (action) verbs that 
introduce Davidsonian event arguments, but also adjectives, nouns, and prepositions. 
Thus, event arguments are nowadays widely seen as a trademark for predicates in gen-
eral. For this broader notion of events, which includes, besides events proper, i.e., accom-
plishments and achievements in Vendler’s (1967) terms, also processes and states, Bach 
(1986) coined the term “eventuality”.
The second milestone in the development of the Davidsonian program is Kratzer’s 
(1995) event semantic treatment of the so-called stage-level/individual-level distinction, 
which goes back to Carlson (1977) and, as a precursor, Milsark (1974, 1977). Roughly 
speaking, stage-level predicates (SLPs) express temporary or accidental properties, 
whereas individual-level predicates (ILPs) express (more or less) permanent or inherent 
properties. On Kratzer’s (1995) account, the SLP/ILP-distinction basically boils down 
to the presence or absence of an extra event argument. Stage-level predicates are taken 
to have such an additional event argument, while individual-level predicates lack it. 
This difference in argument structure is then exploited syntactically by the assumption, 
e.g., of different subject positions for SLPs and ILPs; see Diesing (1992). Since then 
interest has been directed towards the role of event arguments at the syntax/semantics 
interface.
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These developments are accompanied by a newly found interest in the linguistic and 
ontological foundation of events. To the extent that more attention is paid to less typical 
events than the classical “Jones buttering a toast” or “Brutus stabbing Caesar”, which 
always come to the Davidsonian semanticist’s mind fi rst, there is a growing awareness 
of the vagueness and incongruities lurking behind the notion of events and its use in 
linguistic theorizing. A particularly controversial case in point is the status of states. The 
question of whether state expressions can be given a Davidsonian treatment analogous 
to process and event expressions (in the narrow sense) is still open to debate.
All in all, Davidsonian event arguments have become a very familiar “all-purpose” 
linguistic instrument over the past decades, and recent years have seen a continual exten-
sion of possible applications far beyond the initial focus on verb semantics and adver-
bials also including a growing body of psycholinguistic studies that aim to investigate the 
role of events in natural language representation and processing.
This article will trace the motivation, development, and applications of event seman-
tics during the past decades and provide a picture of current views on the role of events 
in natural language meaning. Section 2 introduces the classical Davidsonian paradigm, 
providing an overview of its motivation and some classical and current applications, as 
well as an ontological characterization of events and their linguistic diagnostics. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the Neo-Davidsonian turn with its broader perspective on eventualities 
and the use of thematic roles. This section also includes some notes on decompositional 
approaches to event semantics. Section 4 turns to the stage-level/individual-level distinc-
tion outlining the basic linguistic phenomena that are grouped together under this label 
and discussing the event semantic treatments that have been proposed as well as the 
criticism they have received. Section 5 returns to ontological matters by reconsidering 
the category of states and asking whether indeed all of them, in particular the referents 
introduced by so-called “statives”, fulfi ll the criteria for Davidsonian eventualities. And, 
fi nally, section 6 presents some experimental results of recent psycholinguistic studies 
that have tested the insights of Davidsonian event semantics. The article concludes with 
some fi nal remarks in section 7.
2. Davidsonian event semantics
2.1. Motivation and applications
On the standard view in Pre-Davidsonian times, a transitive verb such as to butter in (1a) 
would be conceived of as introducing a relation between the subject Jones and the direct 
object the toast, thus yielding the logical form (1b).
(1) a. Jones buttered the toast.
 b. butter (jones, the toast)
The only individuals that sentence (1a) talks about according to (1b) are Jones and the 
toast. As Davidson (1967) points out such a representation does not allow us to refer 
explicitly to the action described by the sentence and specify it further by adding, e.g., 
that Jones did it slowly, deliberately, with a knife, in the bathroom, at midnight. What, 
asks Davidson, does it refer to in such a continuation? His answer is that action verbs 
introduce an additional hidden event argument that stands for the action proper. Under 
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this perspective, a transitive verb introduces a three-place relation holding between the 
subject, the direct object and an event argument. Davidson’s proposal thus amounts to 
replacing (1b) with the logical form in (1c).
(1) c. e [butter (jones, the toast, e)]
This move paves the way for a straightforward analysis of adverbial modifi cation. 
If verbs introduce a hidden event argument, then standard adverbial modifi ers may 
be simply analyzed as fi rst-order predicates that add information about this event; cf. 
article 54 (Maienborn & Schäfer) Adverbs and adverbials on the problems of alternative 
analyses and further details of the Davidsonian approach to adverbial modifi cation. Thus, 
Davidson’s classical sentence (2a) takes the logical form (2b).
(2) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with the knife at midnight.
 b.  e [butter (jones, the toast, e) & in (e, the bathroom) & instr (e, the knife) & 
at (e, midnight)]
According to (2b), sentence (2a) expresses that there was an event of Jones buttering the 
toast, and this event was located in the bathroom. In addition, it was performed by using 
a knife as an instrument, and it took place at midnight. Thus, the verb’s hidden event 
argument provides a suitable target for adverbial modifi ers. As Davidson points out, this 
allows adverbial modifi ers to be treated analogously to adnominal modifi ers: Both target 
the referential argument of their verbal or nominal host.
Adverbial modifi cation is thus seen to be logically on a par with adjectival modifi cation: 
what adverbial clauses modify is not verbs but the events that certain verbs introduce.
Davidson (1969/1980: 167)
One of the major advances achieved through the analysis of adverbial modifi ers as 
fi rst-order predicates on the verb’s event argument is its straightforward account of the 
characteristic entailment patterns of sentences with adverbial modifi ers. For instance, we 
want to be able to infer from (2a) the truth of the sentences in (3). On a Davidsonian 
account this follows directly from the logical form (2b) by virtue of the logical rule of 
simplifi cation; cf. (3'). See, e.g., Eckardt (1998, 2002) on the diffi culties that these entail-
ment patterns pose for a classical operator approach to adverbials such as advocated by 
Thomason & Stalnaker (1973), see also article 54 (Maienborn & Schäfer) Adverbs and 
adverbials.
(3) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom at midnight.
 b. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom.
 c. Jones buttered the toast at midnight.
 d. Jones butterd the toast with the knife.
 e. Jones buttered the toast.
(3') a. e [butter (jones, the toast, e) & in (e, the bathroom) & at (e, midnight)]
 b. e [butter (jones, the toast, e) & in (e, the bathroom)]
 c. e [butter (jones, the toast, e) & at (e, midnight)]
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 d. e [butter (jones, the toast, e) & instr (e, the knife)]
 e. e [butter (jones, the toast, e)]
Further evidence for the existence of hidden event arguments can be adduced from 
anaphoricity, quantifi cation and defi nite descriptions among others: Having introduced 
event arguments, the anaphoric pronoun it in (4) may now straightforwardly be analyzed 
as referring back to a previously mentioned event, just like other anaphoric expressions 
take up object referents and the like.
(4) It happened silently and in complete darkness.
Hidden event arguments also provide suitable targets for numerals and frequency 
adverbs as in (5).
(5) a. Anna has read the letter three times/many times.
 b. Anna has often/seldom/never read the letter.
Krifka (1990) shows that nominal measure expressions may also be used as a means of 
measuring the event referent introduced by the verb. Krifka’s example (6) has a reading 
which does not imply that there were necessarily 4000 ships that passed through the lock 
in the given time span but that there were 4000 passing events of maybe just one single 
ship. That is, what is counted by the nominal numeral in this reading are passing events 
rather than ships.
(6) 4000 ships passed through the lock last year.
Finally, events may also serve as referents for defi nite descriptions as in (7).
(7) a. the fall of the Berlin Wall
 b. the buttering of the toast
 c. the sunrise
See, e.g., Bierwisch (1989), Grimshaw (1990), Zucchi (1993), Ehrich & Rapp (2000), Rapp 
(2007) for event semantic treatments of nominalizations; cf. also article 51 (Grimshaw) 
Deverbal nominalization. Engelberg (2000: 100ff) offers an overview of the phenomena 
for which event-based analyses have been proposed since Davidson’s insight was taken 
up and developed further in linguistics.
The overall conclusion that Davidson invites us to draw from all these linguistic data 
is that events are things in the real world like objects; they can be counted, they can be 
anaphorically referred to, they can be located in space and time, they can be ascribed 
further properties. All this indicates that the world, as we conceive of it and talk about it, 
is apparently populated by such things as events.
2.2. Ontological properties and linguistic diagnostics
Semantic research over the past decades has provided impressive confi rmation of 
Davidson’s (1969/1980: 137) claim that “there is a lot of language we can make system-
atic sense of if we suppose events exist”. But, with Quine’s dictum “No entity without 
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identity!” in mind, we have to ask: What kind of things are events? What are their 
identity criteria? And how are their ontological properties refl ected through linguistic 
structure?
None of these questions has received a defi nitive answer so far, and many versions 
of the Davidsonian approach have been proposed, with major and minor differences 
between them. Focussing on the commonalities behind these differences, it still seems 
safe to say that there is at least one core assumption in the Davidsonian approach that 
is shared more or less explicitly by most scholars working in this paradigm. This is that 
eventualities are, fi rst and foremost, particular spatiotemporal entities in the world. 
As LePore (1985: 151) puts it, “[Davidson’s] central claim is that events are concrete partic-
ulars – that is, unrepeatable entities with a location in space and time.” As the past decades’ 
discussion of this issue has shown (see, e.g., the overviews in Lombard 1998, Engelberg 
2000, and Pianesi & Varzi 2000), it is nevertheless notoriously diffi cult to turn the above 
ontological outline into precise identity criteria for eventualities. For illustration, I will 
mention just two prominent attempts.
Lemmon (1967) suggests that two events are identical just in case they occupy the 
same portion of space and time. This notion of events seems much too coarse-grained, 
at least for linguistic purposes, since any two events that just happen to coincide in 
space and time would, on this account, be identical. To take Davidson’s (1969/1980: 178) 
example, we wouldn’t be able to distinguish the event of a metal ball rotating around its 
own axis during a certain time from an event of the metal ball becoming warmer during 
the very same time span. Note that we could say that the metal ball is slowly becoming 
warmer while it is rotating quickly, without expressing a contradiction. This indicates that 
we are dealing with two separate events that coincide in space and time.
Parsons (1990), on the other hand, attempts to establish genuinely linguistic identity 
criteria for events: “When a verb-modifi er appears truly in one source and falsely in 
another, the events cannot be identical.” (Parsons 1990: 157). This, by contrast, yields a 
notion of events that is too fi ne-grained; see, e.g., the criticism by Eckardt (1998: § 3.1) 
and Engelberg (2000: 221–225). What we are still missing, then, are ontological criteria of 
the appropriate grain for identifying events. This is the conclusion Pianesi & Varzi (2000) 
arrive at in their discussion of the ontological nature of events:
[…] the idea that events are spatiotemporal particulars whose identity criteria are mod-
erately thin […] has found many advocates both in the philosophical and in the linguistic 
literature. […] But they all share with Davidson’s the hope for a ‘middle ground’ account of 
the number of particular events that may simultaneously occur in the same place.
Pianesi & Varzi (2000: 555)
We can conclude, then, that the search for ontological criteria for identifying events will 
probably continue for some time. In the meantime, linguistic research will have to build 
on a working defi nition that is up to the demands of natural language analysis.
What might also be crucial for our notion of events (besides their spatial and temporal 
dimensions) is their inherently relational character. Authors like Parsons (1990), Carlson 
(1998), Eckardt (1998), and Asher (2000) have argued that events necessarily involve 
participants serving some function. In fact, the ability of Davidsonian analyses to make 
explicit the relationship between events and their participants, either via thematic roles 
or by some kind of decomposition (see sections 3.2 and 3.3 below), is certainly one of 
the major reasons among linguists for the continuing popularity of such analyses. This 
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feature of Davidsonian analyses is captured by the statement in (8), which I will adopt as 
a working defi nition for the subsequent discussion; cf. Maienborn (2005a).
(8) Davidsonian notion of events:
  Events are particular spatiotemporal entities with functionally integrated parti-
cipants.
(8) may be taken to be the core assumption of the Davidsonian paradigm. Several onto-
logical properties follow from it. As spatiotemporal entities in the world, events can 
be perceived, and they have a location in space and time. In addition, given the functio-
nal integration of participants, events can vary in the way that they are realized. These 
properties are summarized in (9):
(9) Ontological properties of events:
 a. Events are perceptible.
 b. Events can be located in space and time.
 c. Events can vary in the way that they are realized.
The properties in (9) can, in turn, be used to derive well-known linguistic event dia-
gnostics:
(10) Linguistic diagnostics for events:
 a. Event expressions can serve as infi nitival complements of perception verbs.
 b. Event expressions combine with locative and temporal modifi ers.
 c. Event expressions combine with manner adverbials, comitatives, etc.
The diagnostics in (10) provide a way to detect hidden event arguments. As shown by 
Higginbotham (1983), perception verbs with infi nitival complements are a means of 
expressing direct event perception and thus provide a suitable test context for event 
expressions; cf. also Eckardt (2002). A sentence such as (11a) expresses that Anna per-
ceived the event of Heidi cutting the roses. This does not imply that Anna was necessarily 
aware of, e.g., who was performing the action; see the continuation in (11b). Sentence 
(11c), on the other hand, does not express direct event perception but rather fact percep-
tion. Whatever it was that Anna perceived, it made her conclude that Heidi was cutting 
the roses. A continuation along the lines of (11b) is not allowed here; cf. Bayer (1986) 
on what he calls the epistemic neutrality of event perception vs. the epistemic load of fact 
perception.
(11) a. Anna saw Heidi cut the roses.
 b.  Anna saw Heidi cut the roses, but she didn’t recognize that it was Heidi who cut 
the roses.
 c.  Anna saw that Heidi was cutting the roses (*but she didn’t recognize that it was 
Heidi who cut the roses).
On the basis of the ontological properties of events spelled-out in (9b) and (9c), we also 
expect event expressions to combine with locative and temporal modifi ers as well as 
with manner adverbials, instrumentals, comitatives and the like – that is, modifi ers that 
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elaborate on the internal functional set-up of events. This was already illustrated by our 
sentence (2); see article 54 (Maienborn & Schäfer) Adverbs and adverbials for details on 
the contribution of manner adverbials and similar expressions that target the internal 
structure of events.
This is, in a nutshell, the Davidsonian view shared (explicitly or implicitly) by current 
event-based approaches. The diagnostics in (10) provide a suitable tool for detecting 
hidden event arguments and may therefore help us to assess the Neo-Davidsonian claim 
that event arguments are not confi ned to action verbs but have many further sources, to 
which we will turn next.
3. The Neo-Davidsonian turn
3.1. The notion of eventualities
Soon after they took the linguistic stage, it became clear that event arguments were 
not to be understood as confi ned to the class of action verbs, as Davidson originally 
proposed, but were likely to have a much wider distribution. A guiding assumption 
of what has been called the Neo-Davidsonian paradigm, developed particularly by 
Higginbotham (1985, 2000) and Parsons (1990, 2000), is that any verbal predicate may 
have such a hidden Davidsonian argument as illustrated by the following quotations 
from Higginbotham (1985) and Chierchia (1995).
The position E corresponds to the ‘hidden’ argument place for events, originally suggested 
by Donald Davidson (1967). There seem to be strong arguments in favour of, and little to be 
said against, extending Davidson’s idea to verbs other than verbs of change or action. Under 
this extension, statives will also have E-positions.
Higginbotham (1985: 10)
A basic assumption I am making is that every VP, whatever its internal structure and 
aspectual characteristics, has an extra argument position for eventualities, in the spirit of 
Davidson’s proposal. […] In a way, having this extra argument slot is part of what makes 
something a VP, whatever its inner structure.
Chierchia (1995: 204)
Note that already some of the fi rst commentators on Davidson’s proposal took a simi-
larly broad view on the possible sources for Davidson’s extra argument. For instance, 
Kim (1969: 204) notes: “When we talk of explaining an event, we are not excluding what, 
in a narrower sense of the term, is not an event but rather a state or a process.” So it was 
only natural to extend Davidson’s original proposal and combine it with Vendler’s (1967) 
classifi cation of situation types into states, activities, accomplishments and achievements. 
In fact, the continuing strength and attractiveness of the overall Davidsonian enterprise 
for contemporary linguistics rests to a great extent on the combination of these two con-
genial insights: Davidson’s introduction of an ontological category of events present in 
linguistic structure, and Vendler’s subclassifi cation of different situation types according 
to the temporal-aspectual properties of the respective verb phrases; cf., e.g., Piñón (1997), 
Engelberg (2002), Sæbø (2006) for some more recent event semantic studies on the 
lexical and/or aspectual properties of certain verb classes.
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The defi nition and delineation of events (comprising Vendler’s accomplishments and 
achievements), processes (activities in Vendler’s terms) and states has been an extensively 
discussed and highly controversial topic of studies particularly on tense and aspect. The 
reader is referred to the articles 48 (Filip) Aspectual class and Aktionsart and 97 (Smith) 
Tense and aspect. For our present purposes the following brief remarks shall suffi ce:
First, a terminological note: The notion “event” is often understood in a broad sense, 
i.e. as covering, besides events in a narrow sense, processes and states as well. Bach (1986) 
has introduced the term “eventuality” for this broader notion of events. In the remainder 
of this article I will stick to speaking of events in a broad sense unless explicitly indicated 
otherwise. Other labels for an additional Davidsonian event argument that can be found 
in the literature include “spatiotemporal location” (e.g. Kratzer 1995) and “Davidsonian 
argument” (e.g. Chierchia 1995).
Secondly, events (in a narrow sense), processes, and states may be characterized in 
terms of dynamicity and telicity. Events and processes are dynamic eventualities, states 
are static. Furthermore, events have an inherent culmination point, i.e., they are telic, 
whereas processes and states, being atelic, have no such inherent culmination point; see 
Krifka (1989, 1992, 1998) for a mereological characterization of events and cf. also Dowty 
(1979), Rothstein (2004).
Finally, accomplishments and achievements, the two subtypes of events in a narrow 
sense, differ wrt. their temporal extension. Whereas accomplishments such as expressed 
by read the book, eat one pound of cherries, run the 100m fi nal have a temporal extension, 
achievements such as reach the summit, fi nd the solution, win the 100m fi nal are momen-
tary changes of state with no temporal duration. See Kennedy & Levin (2008) on so-
called degree achievements expressed by verbs like to lengthen, to cool, etc. The variable 
aspectual behavior of these verbs – atelic (permitting the combination with a for-PP) or 
telic (permitting the combination with an in-PP) – is explained in terms of the relation 
between the event structure and the scalar structure of the base adjective; cf. (12).
(12) a. The soup cooled for 10 minutes. (atelic)
 b. The soup cooled in 10 minutes. (telic)
Turning back to the potential sources for Davidsonian event arguments, in more recent 
times not only verbs, whether eventive or stative, have been taken to introduce an addi-
tional argument, but other lexical categories as well, such as adjectives, nouns and also 
prepositions. Motivation for this move comes from the observation that all predica-
tive categories provide basically the same kind of empirical evidence that motivated 
Davidson’s proposal and thus call for a broader application of the Davidsonian analysis. 
The following remarks from Higginbotham & Ramchand (1997) are typical of this view:
Once we assume that predicates (or their verbal, etc. heads) have a position for events, 
taking the many consequences that stem therefrom, as outlined in publications originating 
with Donald Davidson (1967), and further applied in Higginbotham (1985, 1989), and 
Terence Parsons (1990), we are not in a position to deny an event-position to any predicate; 
for the evidence for, and applications of, the assumption are the same for all predicates.
Higginbotham & Ramchand (1997: 54)
As these remarks indicate, nowadays Neo-Davidsonian approaches often take event 
arguments to be a trademark not only of verbs but of predicates in general. We will come 
back to this issue in section 5 when we reconsider the category of states.
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3.2. Events and thematic roles
The second core assumption of Neo-Davidsonian accounts, besides assuming a broader 
distribution of event arguments, concerns the way of relating the event argument to the 
predicate and its regular arguments. While Davidson (1967) introduced the event argu-
ment as an additional argument to the verbal predicate thereby augmenting its arity, 
Neo-Davidsonian accounts use the notion of thematic roles for linking an event to its 
participants. Thus, the Neo-Davidsonian version of Davidson’s logical form in (2b) for 
the classical sentence (2a), repeated here as (13a/b) takes the form in (13c).
(13) a. Jones buttered the toast in the bathroom with the knife at midnight.
 b.  e [butter (jones, the toast, e) & in (e, the bathroom) & instr (e, the knife) & 
at (e, midnight)]
 c.  e [butter (e) & agent (e, jones) & patient (e, the toast) & in (e, the bathroom) 
& instr (e, the knife) & at (e, midnight)]
On a Neo-Davidsonian view, all verbs are uniformly one-place predicates ranging over 
events. The verb’s regular arguments are introduced via thematic roles such as agent, 
patient, experiencer, etc., which express binary relations holding between events 
and their participants; cf. article 18 (Davis) Thematic roles for details on the nature, 
inventory and hierarchy of thematic roles. Note that due to this move of separating the 
verbal predicate from its arguments and adding them as independent conjuncts, Neo-
Davidsonian accounts give up to some extent the distinction between arguments and 
modifi ers. At least it isn’t possible anymore to read off the number of arguments a verb 
has from the logical representation. While Davidson’s notation in (13b) conserves the 
argument/modifi er distinction by reserving the use of thematic roles for the integration 
of circumstantial modifi ers, the Neo-Davidsonian notation (13c) uses thematic roles both 
for arguments such as the agent Jones as well as for modifi ers such as the instrumental 
the knife; see Parsons (1990: 96ff) for motivation and defense and Bierwisch (2005) for 
some criticism on this point.
3.3. Decompositional event semantics
The overall Neo-Davidsonian approach is also compatible with adopting a decomposi-
tional perspective on the semantics of lexical items, particularly of verbs; cf. articles 16 
(Bierwisch) Semantic features and primes and 17 (Engelberg) Frameworks of decompo-
sition. Besides a standard lexical entry for a transitive verb such as to close in (14a) that 
translates the verbal meaning into a one-place predicate close on events, one might also 
choose to decompose the verbal meaning into more basic semantic predicates like the 
classical cause, become etc; cf. Dowty (1979). A somewhat simplifi ed version of Parsons’ 
“subatomic” approach is given in (14b); cf. Parsons (1990: 120).
(14) a. to close: λy λx λe [close (e) & agent (e, x) & theme (e, y)]
 b. to close:  λy λx λe [agent (e, x) & theme (e, y) & e' [cause (e, e') & theme 
(e', y) & s [become (e', s) & closed (s) & theme (s, y)]]]
According to (14b) the transitive verb to close expresses an action e taken by an agent 
x on a theme y which causes an event e' of y changing into a state s of being closed. 
On this account a causative verb introduces not one hidden event argument but three. 
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See also Pustejovsky (1991, 1995) for a somewhat different conception of a decomposi-
tional event structure.
Additional subevent or state arguments as introduced in (14b) might also be targeted 
by particular modifi ers. For instance, the repetitive/restitutive ambiguity of again can 
be accounted for by letting again, roughly speaking, have scope over either the causing 
event e (= repetitive reading) or the resulting state s (= restitutive reading); cf., e.g., the 
discussion in von Stechow (1996, 2003), Jäger & Blutner (2003). Of course, assuming 
further implicit event and state arguments, as illustrated in (14b), raises several intricate 
questions concerning, e.g., whether, when, and how such subevent variables that depend 
upon the verb’s main event argument are bound. No common practice has evolved 
so far on how these dependent event arguments are compositionally treated. See 
also Bierwisch (2005) for arguments against projecting more than the highest event
argument onto the verb’s argument structure.
This might be the right place to add a remark on a further tradition of decomposi-
tional event semantics that goes back to Reichenbach (1947). Davidson’s core idea of 
introducing event arguments can already be found in Reichenbach (1947), who, instead 
of adding an extra argument to verbal predicates, assumed a more general “event func-
tion” [ p ]*, by which a proposition p is turned into a characteristic property of events; 
see Bierwisch (2005) for a comparison of the Davidsonian, Neo-Davidsonian and 
Reichenbachian approaches to events. (Note that Reichenbach used the two notions 
“event function” and “fact function” synonymously.)
Thus, Reichenbach’s way of introducing an event variable for the verb to butter would 
lead to the representation in (15a). This in turn yields (15b) as Reichenbach’s version of 
the logical form for the classical sentence (2a).
(15) a. [butter (x, y)]*(e)
 b.  e [ [butter (jones, the toast)]*(e) & in (e, the bathroom) & instr (e, the knife) 
& at (e, midnight)]
As Bierwisch (2005: 20) points out, Reichenbach’s and Davidson’s event variables were 
intended to account for roughly the same range of phenomena, including an analysis of 
adverbial modifi cation in terms of conjunctively added event predicates.
Note that Kamp & Reyle’s (1993) use of the colon to characterize an event e by 
a proposition p in DRT is basically a variant of Reichenbach’s event function; cf. also 
article 37 (Kamp & Reyle) Discourse Representation Theory. Further notational variants 
are Bierwisch’s (1988, 1997) inst-operator e inst p, or the use of curly brackets {p}(e) 
in Wunderlich (1997). All these are different notational versions for expressing that an 
event e is partially characterized by a proposition p.
Reichenbach’s event function offers a way to pursue a decompositional approach to 
event semantics without being committed to a Parsons’-style proliferation of subevent 
variables (with their unclear binding conditions) as illustrated in (14b). Thus, a (some-
what simplifi ed) Bierwisch-style decomposition for our sample transitive verb to close 
would look like (16).
(16) to close: λy λx λe [e: cause (x, become (closed (y))]
As these remarks show, there is a considerable range of variation exploited by current 
event semantic approaches as to the extent to which event and subevent variables are 
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used and combined with further semantic instruments such as decompositional and/or 
thematic role approaches.
4. The stage-level/individual-level distinction
4.1. Linguistic phenomena
A particularly prominent application fi eld for contemporary event semantic research 
is provided by the so-called stage-level/individual-level distinction, which goes back to 
Carlson (1977) and, as a precursor, Milsark (1974, 1977). Roughly speaking, stage-level 
predicates (SLPs) express temporary or accidental properties, whereas individual-level 
predicates (ILPs) express (more or less) permanent or inherent properties; some exam-
ples are given in (17) vs. (18).
(17) Stage-level predicates
 a. adjectives: tired, drunk, available, …
 b. verbs: speak, wait, arrive, …
(18) Individual-level predicates
 a. adjectives: intelligent, blond, altruistic, …
 b. verbs: know, love, resemble, …
The stage-level/individual-level distinction is taken to be a conceptually founded dis-
tinction that is grammatically refl ected. Lexical predicates are classifi ed as being either 
SLPs or ILPs. In the last years, a growing list of quite diverse linguistic phenomena have 
been associated with this distinction. Some illustrative cases will be mentioned next; cf., 
e.g., Higginbotham & Ramchand (1997), Fernald (2000), Jäger (2001), Maienborn (2003: 
§2.3) for commented overviews of SLP/ILP diagnostics that have been discussed in the 
literature.
4.1.1. Subject eff ects
Bare plural subjects of SLPs have, besides a generic reading (‘Firemen are usually avail-
able.’), also an existential reading (‘There are fi remen who are available.’) whereas bare 
plural subjects of ILPs only have a generic reading (‘Firemen are usually altruistic.’):
(19) a. Firemen are available. (SLP: generic + existential reading)
 b. Firemen are altruistic. (ILP: only generic reading)
4.1.2. There-coda
Only SLPs (20) but not ILPs (21) may appear in the coda of a there-construction:
(20) a. There were children sick. (SLP)
 b. There was a door open.
(21) a. *There were children tall. (ILP)
 b. *There was a door wooden.
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4.1.3. Antecedents in when-conditionals
ILPs cannot appear as restrictors of when-conditionals (provided that all argument 
positions are fi lled with defi nites; cf. Kratzer 1995):
(22) a. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well. (SLP)
 b. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well. (ILP)
4.1.4. Combination with locative modifi ers
SLPs can be combined with locative modifi ers (23a), while ILPs don’t accept locatives 
(23b):
(23) a. Maria was tired/hungry/nervous in the car. (SLP)
 b. ??Maria was blond/intelligent/a linguist in the car. (ILP)
Adherents of the stage-level/individual-level distinction take data like (23) as strong sup-
port for the claim that there is a fundamental difference between SLPs and ILPs in the 
ability to be located in space; see, e.g., the following quote from Fernald (2000: 24): “It is 
clear that SLPs differ from ILPs in the ability to be located in space and time.”
4.1.5. Complements of perception verbs
Only SLPs, not ILPs, are admissible as small clause complements of perception verbs:
(24) a. Johann saw the king naked. (SLP)
 b. *Johann saw the king tall. (ILP)
4.1.6. Depictives





 at the fence. (SLP)









 at the fence. (ILP)





Further cross-linguistic evidence that has been taken as support for the stage-level/
individual-level distinction includes the alternation of the two copula forms ser and estar 
in Spanish and Portuguese (see Maienborn 2005c for a critical discussion), two different 
subject positions for copular sentences in Scottish Gaelic (e.g. Ramchand 1996), or the 
Nominative/Instrumental case alternation of nominal copular predicates in Russian (e.g. 
Geist 2006).
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In sum, the standard perspective under which all these contrasts concerning subject 
effects, when-conditionals, locative modifi ers, and so on have been considered is that they 
are distinct surface manifestations of a common underlying contrast. The stage-level/
individual-level hypothesis is that the distinction of SLPs and ILPs rests on a funda-
mental (although still not fully understood) conceptual opposition that is refl ected in 
multiple ways in the grammatical system. The following quotation from Fernald (2000) 
is representative of this view:
Many languages display grammatical effects due to the two kinds of predicates, suggesting 
that this distinction is fundamental to the way humans think about the universe.
Fernald (2000: 4)
Given that the conceptual side of the coin is still rather mysterious (Fernald (2000: 4): 
“Whatever sense of permanence is crucial to this distinction, it must be a very weak 
notion”), most stage-level/individual-level advocates content themselves with inves-
tigating the grammatical side (Higginbotham & Ramchand (1997: 53): “Whatever the 
grounds for this distinction, there is no doubt of its force”). We will come back to this 
issue in section 4.3.
4.2. Event semantic treatments
A fi rst semantic analysis of the stage-level/individual-level contrast was developed by 
Carlson (1977). Carlson introduces a new kind of entities, which he calls “stages”. These 
are spatiotemporal partitions of individuals. SLPs and ILPs are then analyzed as predi-
cates ranging over different kinds of entities: ILPs are predicates over individuals, and 
SLPs are predicates over stages. Thus, on Carlson’s approach the stage-level/individual-
level distinction amounts to a basic difference at the ontological level. Kratzer (1995) 
takes a different direction locating the relevant difference at the level of the argument 
structure of the corresponding predicates. Crucially, SLPs have an extra event argument 
on Kratzer’s account, whereas ILPs lack such an extra argument. The lexical entries for 
a SLP like tired and an ILP like blond are given in (27).
(27) a. tired: λx λe [tired (e, x)]
 b. blond: λx [blond (x)]
This difference in argument structure may now be exploited for selectional restrictions, 
for instance. Perception verbs, e.g., require an event denoting complement; see the 
discussion of (11) in section 2.2. This prerequisite is only fulfi lled by SLPs, which explains 
the SLP/ILP difference observed in (24). Moreover, the ban of ILPs from depictive 
constructions (see (25) vs. (26)) can be traced back to the need of the secondary predi-
cate to provide a state argument that includes temporally the main predicate’s event 
referent.
A very infl uential syntactic explanation for the observed subject effects within 
Kratzer’s framework has been proposed by Diesing (1992). She assumes different sub-
ject positions for SLPs and ILPs: Subjects of SLPs have a VP-internal base position; 
subjects of ILPs are base-generated VP-externally. In addition, Diesing formulates a 
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so-called Mapping Hypothesis, which serves as a syntax/semantics interface condition on 
the derivation of a logical form. (Diesing assumes a Lewis-Kamp-Heim style tripartite 
logical form consisting of a non-selective quantifi er Q, a restrictive clause (RC), and a 
nuclear scope (NS).) Diesing’s (1992) Mapping-Hypothesis states that VP-material is 
mapped into the nuclear scope, and VP-external material is mapped into the restrictive 
clause. Finally, Diesing takes the VP-boundary to be the place for the existential closure 
of the nuclear scope. The different readings for SLP and ILP bare plural subjects follow 
naturally from these assumptions: If SLP subjects stay in their VP-internal base position, 
they will be mapped into the nuclear scope and, consequently, fall under the scope of the 
existential quantifi er. This leads to the existential reading; cf. (28a). Or they move to a 
higher, VP-external subject position, in which case they are mapped into the restrictive 
clause and fall under the scope of the generic operator. This leads to the generic reading; 
cf. (28b). ILP subjects, having a VP-external base position, may only exploit the latter 
option. Thus, they only have a generic reading; cf. (29).
(28) a. e, x [ns firemen (x) & available (e, x)] (cf. Kratzer 1995: 141)
 b. Gen e, x [rc firemen (x) & in (x, e)] [ns available (e, x)]
(29) Gen x [rc firemen (x)] [ns altruistic (x)]
Kratzer’s account also offers a straightforward solution for the different behavior of 
SLPs and ILPs wrt. locative modifi cation; cf. (23). Having a Davidsonian event argu-
ment, SLPs provide a suitable target for locative modifi ers, hence, they can be located in 
space. ILPs, on the other hand, lack such an additional event argument, and therefore do 
not introduce any referent whose location could be further specifi ed via adverbial modi-
fi cation. This is illustrated in (30)/(31). While combining a SLP with a locative modifi er 
yields a semantic representation like (30b), any attempt to add a locative to an ILP must 
necessarily fail; cf. (31b).
(30) a. Maria was tired in the car.
 b. e [tired (e, maria) & in (e, the car)]
(31) a. */??Maria was blond in the car.
 b. [blond (maria) & in (???, the car)]
Thus, on a Kratzerian analysis, SLPs and ILPs indeed differ in their ability to be located 
in space (see the above quote from Fernald), and this difference is traced back to the 
presence vs. absence of an event argument. Analogously, the event variable of SLPs 
provides a suitable target for when-conditionals to quantify over in (22a), whereas the 
ILP case (22b) lacks such a variable; cf. Kratzer’s (1995) Prohibition against Vacuous 
Quantifi cation.
A somewhat different event semantic solution for the incompatibility of ILPs with 
locative modifi ers has been proposed by Chierchia (1995). He takes a Neo-Davidso-
nian perspective according to which all predicates introduce event arguments. Thus, 
SLPs and ILPs do not differ in this respect. In order to account for the SLP/ILP con-
trast in combination with locatives, Chierchia then introduces a distinction between two 
kinds of events: SLPs refer to location dependent events whereas ILPs refer to location 
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independent events; see also McNally (1998). The observed behavior wrt. locatives fol-
lows on the assumption that only location dependent events can be located in space. 
As Chierchia (1995: 178) puts it: “Intuitively, it is as if ILP were, so to speak, unlocated. 
If one is intelligent, one is intelligent nowhere in particular. SLP, on the other hand, are 
located in space.”
Despite all differences, Kratzer’s and Chierchia’s analyses have some important com-
monalities. Both consider the SLP/ILP contrast in (30)/(31) as a grammatical effect. That 
is, sentences like (31a) do not receive a compositional semantic representation; they are 
grammatically ill-formed. Kratzer and Chierchia furthermore share the general intuition 
that SLPs (and only those) can be located in space. This is what the difference in (30a) vs. 
(31a) is taken to show. And, fi nally, both analyses rely crucially on the idea that at least 
SLPs, and possibly all predicates, introduce Davidsonian event arguments.
All in all, Kratzer’s (1995) synthesis of the stage-level/individual-level distinction 
with Davidsonian event semantics has been extremely infl uential, opening up a new 
fi eld of research and stimulating the development of further theoretical variants and of 
alternative proposals.
4.3. Criticisms and further developments
In subsequent studies of the stage-level/individual-level distinction two tendencies can 
be observed. On the one hand, the SLP/ILP contrast has been increasingly conceived 
of in information structural terms. Roughly speaking, ILPs relate to categorial judge-
ments, whereas SLPs may build either categorial or thetical judgements; cf., e.g., Ladusaw 
(1994), McNally (1998), Jäger (2001). On this move, the stage-level/individual-level dis-
tinction is usually no longer seen as a lexically codifi ed contrast but rather as being struc-
turally triggered.
On the other hand there is growing skepticism concerning the empirical adequacy of 
the stage-level/individual-level hypothesis. Authors such as Higginbotham & Ramchand 
(1997), Fernald (2000), and Jäger (2001) argue that the phenomena subsumed under this 
label are actually quite distinct and do not yield such a uniform contrast upon closer 
scrutiny as a fi rst glance might suggest.
For instance, as already noted by Bäuerle (1994: 23), the group of SLPs that support 
an existential reading of bare plural subjects is actually quite small; cf. (19a). The majority 
of SLPs, such as tired or hungry in (32) behaves more like ILPs, i.e., they only yield a 
generic reading.
(32) Firemen are hungry/tired. (SLP: only generic reading)
In view of the sentence pair in (33) Higginbotham & Ramchand (1997: 66) suspect 
that some notion of speaker proximity might also be of relevance for the availability of 
existential readings.
(33) a. (Guess whether) fi remen are nearby/at hand.
 b. ?(Guess whether) fi remen are far away/a mile up the road.
There-constructions, on the other hand, also appear to tolerate ILPs, contrary to what 
one would expect; cf. the example (34) taken from Carlson (1977: 72).
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(34) There were fi ve men dead.
Furthermore, as Glasbey (1997) shows, the availability of existential readings for bare 
plural subjects – both for SLPs and ILPs – might also be evoked by the context; cf. the 
following examples taken from Glasbey (1997: 170ff).
(35) a. Children are sick. (SLP: no existential reading)
 b. We must get a doctor. Children are sick. (SLP: existential reading)
(36) a. Drinkers were under-age. (ILP: no existential reading)
 b.  John was shocked by his visit to the Red Lion. Drinkers were under-age, drugs 
were on sale, and a number of fi ghts broke out while he was there.
 (ILP: existential reading)
As these examples show, the picture of the stage-level/individual-level contrast as a clear-
cut, grammatically refl ected distinction becomes a lot less clear upon closer inspection. 
The actual contributions of the lexicon, grammar, conceptual knowledge, and context 
to the emergence of stage-level/individual-level effects still remain largely obscure. 
While the research focus of the stage-level/individual-level paradigm has been directed 
almost exclusively towards the apparent grammatical effects of the SLP/ILP contrast, no 
major efforts were made to uncover its conceptual foundation, although there has never 
been any doubt that a defi nition of SLPs and ILPs in terms of the dichotomy “tempo-
rary vs. permanent” or “accidental vs. essential” cannot be but a rough approximation. 
Rather than being a mere accident, this missing link to a solid conceptual foundation 
could be a hint that the overall perspective on the stage-level/individual-level distinction 
as a genuinely grammatical distinction that refl ects an underlying conceptual opposition 
might be wrong after all. The studies of Glasbey (1997), Maienborn (2003, 2004, 2005c) 
and Magri (2008, 2009) point in this direction. They all argue against treating stage-level/
individual-level effects as grammatical in nature and provide alternative, pragmatic 
analyses for the observed phenomena. In particular, Maienborn argues against an event-
based explanation objecting that the use of Davidsonian event arguments does not 
receive any independent justifi cation in terms of the event criteria discussed in section 
2.2 in such stage-level/individual-level accounts. The crucial question is whether all state 
expressions, or at least those state expressions that express temporary/accidental proper-
ties, i.e. SLPs, can be shown to introduce a Davidsonian event argument. This takes us 
back to the ontological issue of a proper characterization of states.
5. Reconsidering states
As mentioned in section 3.1 above, one of the two central claims of the Neo-Davidsonian 
paradigm is that all predicates, including state expressions, have a hidden event argu-
ment. Despite its popularity this claim has seldom been defended explicitly. Parsons 
(1995, 2000) is among the few advocates of the Neo-Davidsonian approach who have 
subjected this assumption to some scrutiny. And the conclusion he reaches wrt. state 
expressions is rather sobering:
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Based on the considerations reviewed above, it would appear that the underlying state 
analysis is not compelling for any kind of the constructions reviewed here and is not even 
plausible for some (e.g., for nouns). There are a few outstanding problems that the under-
lying state analysis might solve, […] but for the most part the weight of evidence seems to 
go the other way.
(Parsons 2000: 88)
Parsons (2000) puts forth his so-called time travel argument to make a strong case for 
a Neo-Davidsonian analysis of state expressions; but cf. the discussion in Maienborn 
(2007). In any case, if the Neo-Davidsonian assumption concerning state expressions 
is right, we should be able to confi rm the existence of hidden state arguments by the 
event diagnostics mentioned in section 2.2; cf. (10). Maienborn (2003, 2005a) examines 
the behavior of state expressions wrt. these and further event diagnostics and shows that 
there is a fundamental split within the class of non-dynamic expressions: State verbs such 
as sit, stand, lie, wait, gleam, and sleep meet all of the criteria for Davidsonian eventuali-
ties. In contrast, stative verbs like know, weigh, own, and resemble do not meet any of 
them. Moreover, it turns out that copular constructions behave uniformly like stative 
verbs, regardless of whether the predicate denotes a temporary property (SLP) or a 
more-or-less permanent property (ILP).
The behavior of state verbs and statives with respect to perception reports is illus-
trated in (37). While state verbs can serve as infi nitival complements of perception verbs 
(37a-c), statives, including copula constructions, are prohibited in these contexts (37d-e). 
(The argumentation in Maienborn (2003, 2005a) is based on data from German. For ease 
of presentation I will use English examples in the following.)
(37) Perception reports:
 a. I saw the child sit on the bench.
 b. I saw my colleague sleep through the lecture.
 c. I noticed the shoes gleam in the light.
 d. *I saw the child be on the bench.
 e. *I saw the tomatoes weigh 1 pound.
 f. *I saw my aunt resemble Romy Schneider.
Furthermore, as (38a-c) shows, state verbs combine with locative modifi ers, whereas 
statives do not; see (38d-g).
(38) Locative modifi ers:
 a. Hilda waited at the corner.
 b. Bardo slept in a hammock.
 c. The pearls gleamed in her hair.
 d. *The dress was wet on the clothesline.
 e. *Bardo was hungry in front of the fridge.
 f. *The tomatoes weighed 1 pound besides the carrots.
 g. *Bardo knew the answer over there.
Three remarks on locatives should be added here. First, when using locatives as event 
diagnostics we have to make sure to use true event-related adverbials, i.e., locative 
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VP-modifi ers. They should not be confounded with locative frame adverbials such as 
those in (39). These are sentential modifi ers that do not add an additional predicate to a 
VP’s event argument but instead provide a semantically underspecifi ed domain restric-
tion for the overall proposition. Locative frame adverbials often yield temporal or con-
ditional interpretations (e.g. ‘When he was in Italy, Maradona was married.’ for (39c)) 
but might also be interpreted epistemically, for instance (‘According to the belief of the 
people in Italy, Maradona was married.’); see Maienborn (2001) for details and cf. also 
article 54 (Maienborn & Schäfer) Adverbs and adverbials.
(39) Locative frame adverbials:
 a. By candlelight, Carolin resembled her brother.
 b. Maria was drunk in the car.
 c. In Italy, Maradona was married.
Secondly, we are now in a position to make more precise what is going on in sentence 
pairs like (23), repeated here as (40), which are often taken to demonstrate the different 
behavior of SLPs and ILPs wrt. location in space; cf. the discussion in section 4.
(40) a. Maria was tired/hungry/nervous in the car.  (SLP)
 b. ??Maria was blond/intelligent/a linguist in the car. (ILP)
Actually, this SLP/ILP contrast is not an issue of grammaticality but concerns the accept-
ability of these sentences under a temporal reading of the locative frame; cf. Maienborn 
(2004) for a pragmatic explanation of this temporariness effect.
Thirdly, sentences (38d/e) are well-formed under an alternative syntactic analysis that 
takes the locative as the main predicate and the adjective as a depictive secondary predi-
cate. Under this syntactic analysis sentence (38d) would express that there was a state of 
the dress being on the clothesline, and this state is temporally included in an accompa-
nying state of the dress being wet. This is not the kind of evidence needed to substantiate 
the Neo-Davidsonian claim that states can be located in space. If the locative were a true 
event-related modifi er, sentence (38d) should have the interpretation: There was a state of 
wetness of the dress, and this state is located on the clothesline. (38d) has no such reading; 
cf. the discussion on this point between Rothstein (2005) and Maienborn (2005b).
Turning back to our event diagnostics, the same split within the group of state expres-
sions that we observed in the previous cases also shows up with manner adverbials, 
comitatives and the like – that is, modifi ers that elaborate on the internal functional 
structure of events. State verbs combine regularly with them, whereas statives do not, as 
(41) shows. Katz (2003) dubbed this the Stative Adverb Gap.
(41) Manner adverbials etc.:
 a. Bardo slept calmly/with his teddy/without a pacifi er.
 b. Carolin sat motionless/stiff at the table.
 c. The pearls gleamed dully/reddishly/moistly.
 d. *Bardo was calmly/with his teddy/without a pacifi er tired.
 e. *Carolin was restlessly/patiently thirsty.
 f. *Andrea resembled with her daughter Romy Schneider.
 g. *Bardo owned thriftily/generously much money.
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There has been some discussion on apparent counterexamples to this Stative Adverb 
Gap such as (42). While, e.g., Jäger (2001), Mittwoch (2005), Dölling (2005) or Rothstein 
(2005) conclude that such cases provide convincing evidence for assuming a Davidsonian 
argument for statives as well, Katz (2000, 2003, 2008) and Maienborn (2003, 2005a,b, 2007) 
argue that these either involve degree modifi cation as in (42a) or are instances of event 
coercion, i.e. a sentence such as (42b) is, strictly speaking, ungrammatical but can be “res-
cued” by inferring some event argument to which the manner adverbial may then apply 
regularly; see the discussion in section 6.2. For instance, what John is passionate about in 
(42b) is not the state of being a Catholic but the activities associated with this state (e.g. 
going to mass, praying, going to confession). If no related activities come to mind for some 
predicate such as being a relative of Grit in (42'b) then the pragmatic rescue fails and the 
sentence becomes odd. According to this view, understanding sentences such as (42b) 
requires a non-compositional reinterpretation of the stative expression that is triggered 
by the lack of a regular Davidsonian event argument.
(42) a. Lisa fi rmly believed that James was innocent.
 b. John was a Catholic with great passion in his youth.
(42') b. ??John was a relative of Grit with great passion in his youth.
See also Rothmayr (2009) for a recent analysis of the semantics of stative verbs including 
a decompositional account of stative/eventive ambiguities as illustrated in (43):
(43) a. Hair obstructed the drain.  (stative reading)
 b. A plumber obstructed the drain. (preferred eventive reading)
A further case of stative/eventive ambiguities is discussed by Engelberg (2005) in 
his study of dispositional verbs such as German helfen (help), gefährden (endanger), 
erleichtern (facilitate). These verbs may have an eventive or a stative reading depending 
on whether the subject is nominal or sentential; cf. (44). Trying to account for these read-
ings within the Davidsonian program turns out to be challenging in several respects. 
Engelberg advocates the philosophical concept of supervenience as a useful device to 
account for the evaluative rather than causal dependency of the effect state expressed 
by these verbs.
(44) a. Rebecca helped Jamaal in the kitchen. (eventive)
 b. That Rebecca had fi xed the water pipes helped Jamaal in the kitchen. (stative)
In view of the evidence reviewed above, it seems justifi ed to conclude that the class of 
statives, including all copular constructions, does not behave as one would expect if they 
had a hidden Davidsonian argument, regardless of whether they express a temporary 
or a permanent property. What conclusions should we draw from these linguistic obser-
vations concerning the ontological category of states? There are basically two lines of 
argumentation that have been pursued in the literature.
Maienborn takes the behavior wrt. the classical event diagnostics in (10) as a suf-
fi ciently strong linguistic indication of an underlying ontological difference and assumes 
that only state verbs denote true Davidsonian eventualities, i.e., Davidsonian states, 
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whereas statives resist a Davidsonian analysis but refer instead to what Maienborn calls 
Kimian states, exploiting Kim’s (1969, 1976) notion of temporally bound property exem-
plifi cations. Kimian states may be located in time and they allow for anaphoric reference, 
Yet, in lacking an inherent spatial dimension, They are ontologically “poorer”, more 
abstract entities than Davidsonian eventualities; cf. Maienborn (2003, 2005a, b, 2007)
for details.
Authors like Dölling (2005), Higginbotham (2005), Ramchand (2005) or Rothstein 
(2005) take a different track. On their perspective, the observed linguistic differences call 
for a more liberal defi nition of eventualities that includes the referents of stative expres-
sions. In particular, they are willing to give up the assumption of eventualities having 
an inherent spatial dimension. Hence, Ramchand (2005: 372) proposes the following 
alternative to the defi nition offered in (8):
(45)  Eventualities are abstract entities with constitutive participants and with a constitu-
tive relation to the temporal dimension.
So the issue basically is whether we opt for a narrow or a broad defi nition of events. 
40 years after Davidson’s fi rst plea for events we still don’t know for sure what kind of 
things event(ualitie)s actually are.
6. Psycholinguistic studies
In recent years, a growing interest has emerged in testing hypotheses on theoretical 
linguistic assumptions about event structure by means of psycholinguistic experi-
ments. Two research areas involving events have attracted major interest within the still
developing fi eld of semantic processing; cf. articles 15 (Bott, Featherston, Radó &
Stalterfoht) Experimental methods, 102 (Frazier) Meaning in psycholinguistics. These
are the processing of underlying event structures and of event coercion.
6.1. The processing of underlying event structures
The fi rst focus of interest concerns the issue of distinguishing different kinds of events 
in terms of the complexity of their internal structure. Gennari & Poeppel (2003) show 
that the processing of event sentences such as (46a) takes signifi cantly longer than the 
processing of otherwise similar stative sentences such as (46b).
(46) a. The visiting scientist solved the intricate math problem. (eventive)
 b. The visiting scientist lacked any knowledge of English. (stative)
This processing difference is attributed to eventive verbs having a more complex decom-
positional structure than stative verbs; cf. the Bierwisch-style representations in (47).
(47) a. to solve: λy λx λe [e: cause (x, become (solved (y))]
 b. to lack: λy λx λs [s: lack (x, y)]
Thus, the study of Gennari & Poeppel (2003) adduces empirical evidence for the event 
vs. state distinction and it provides experimental support for the psychological reality of 
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structuring natural language meaning in terms of decompositional representations. This 
is, of course, a highly controversial issue; cf. the argumentation in Fodor, Fodor & Garrett 
(1975), de Almeida (1999) and Fodor & LePore (1998) against decomposition, and see 
also the more differentiated perspective taken in Mobayyen & de Almeida (2005).
McKoon & Macfarland (2000, 2002), taking up a distinction made by Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav (1995) investigate two kinds of causative verbs, viz. verbs denoting an 
externally caused event (e.g. break) as opposed to verbs denoting an internally caused 
event (e.g. bloom). Whereas the former include a causing subevent as well as a change-
of-state subevent, the latter only express a change of state; cf. McKoon & Macfarland 
(2000: 834). Thus, the two verb classes differ wrt. their decompositional complexity. 
McKoon and Macfarland describe a series of experiments that show that there are clear 
processing differences corresponding to this lexical distinction. Sentences with external 
causation verbs take signifi cantly longer to process than sentences with internal causa-
tion verbs. In addition, this processing difference shows up with the transitive as well 
as the intransitive use of the respective verbs; cf. (48) vs. (49). McKoon and Macfarland 
conclude from this fi nding that the causing subevent remains implicitly present even if 
no explicit cause is mentioned in the break-case. That is, their experiments suggest that 
both transitive and intransitive uses of, e.g., awake in (49) are based on the same lexical
semantic event structure consisting of two subevents. And conversely if an internal causa-
tion verb is used transitively, as wilt in (48a), the sentence is still understood as denoting a 
single event with the subject referent being part of the change-of-state event.
(48) Internal causation verbs:
 a. The bright sun wilted the roses.
 b. The roses wilted.
(49) External causation verbs:
 a. The fi re alarm awoke the residents.
 b. The residents awoke.
In sum, the comprehension of break, awake etc. requires understanding a more complex 
event conceptualization than that of bloom, wilt etc. This psycholinguistic fi nding cor-
roborates theoretically motivated assumptions on the verbs’ lexical semantic represen-
tations. See also Härtl (2008) on a more thorough and differentiated study on implicit 
event information. Härtl discusses whether, to what extent, and at which processing 
level implicit event participants and implicit event predicates are still accessible for 
interpretation purposes.
Most notably, the studies of McKoon & Macfarland (2000, 2002) and Gennari & 
Poeppel (2003) provide strong psycholinguistic support for the assumption that verb 
meanings are represented and processed in terms of an underlying event structure.
6.2. The processing of event coercion
The second focus of psycholinguistic research on events is devoted to the notion of event 
coercion. Coercion refers to the forcing of an alternative interpretation when the compo-
sitional machinery fails to derive a regular interpretation. In other words, event coercion 
is a kind of rescue operation which solves a grammatical confl ict by using additional 
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knowledge about the involved event type; cf. also article 25 (de Swart) Mismatches and 
coercion. There are two types of coercion that are prominently discussed in the literature. 
The fi rst type, the so-called complement coercion is illustrated in (50). The verb to begin 
requires an event-denoting complement and forces the given object-denoting comple-
ment the book into a contextually appropriate event reading. Hence, sentence (50) is 
reinterpreted as expressing that John began, e.g., to read the book; cf., e.g., Pustejovsky 
(1995), Egg (2003).
(50) John began the book.
The second kind, the so-called aspectual coercion refers to a set of options for adjusting 
the aspectual type of a verb phrase according to the demands of a temporal modifi er. For 
instance, the punctual verb to sneeze in (51a) is preferably interpreted iteratively in com-
bination with the durative adverbial for fi ve minutes, whereas the temporal adverbial for 
years forces a habitual reading of the verb phrase to smoke a morning cigarette in (51b), 
and the stative expression to be in one’s offi ce receives an ingressive reinterpretation 
due to the temporal adverbial in 10 minutes in (51c); cf., e.g., Moens & Steedman (1988), 
Pulman (1997), de Swart (1998), Dölling (2003), Egg (2005). See also the classifi cation of 
aspectual coercions developed in Hamm & van Lambalgen (2005).
(51) a. John sneezed for fi ve minutes.
 a. John smoked a morning cigarette for years.
 b. John was in his offi ce in 10 minutes.
There are basically two kinds of theoretical accounts that have been developed for the 
linguistic phenomena subsumed under the label of event coercion: type-shifting accounts 
(e.g., Moens & Steedman 1988, de Swart 1998) and underspecifi cation accounts (e.g., 
Pulman 1997, Egg 2005); cf. articles 24 (Egg) Semantic underspecifi cation and 25 (de 
Swart) Mismatches and coercion. These accounts and the predictions they make for 
the processing of coerced expressions have been the subject of several psycholinguistic 
studies; cf., e.g., de Almeida (2004), Pickering McElree & Traxler (2005) and Traxler et al. 
(2005) on complement coercion and Piñango, Zurif & Jackendoff (1999), Piñango, Mack &
Jackendoff (to appear), Pickering et al. (2006), Bott (2008a, b), Brennan & Pylkkänen 
(2008) on aspectual coercion. The crucial question is whether event coercion causes addi-
tional processing costs, and if so at which point in the course of meaning composition such 
additional processing takes place. The results obtained so far still don’t yield a fully stable 
picture. Whether processing differences are detected or not seems to depend partly on the 
chosen experimental methods and tasks; cf. Pickering et al. (2006). Pylkkänen & McElree 
(2006) draw the following interim balance: Whereas complement coercion always raises 
additional processing costs (at least without contextual support), aspectual coercion does 
not appear to lead to signifi cant processing diffi culties. Pylkkänen & McElree (2006) 
propose the following interpretation of these results: Complement coercion involves an 
ontological type confl ict between the verb’s request for an event argument and a given 
object referent. This ontological type confl ict requires an immediate and time-consuming 
repair; otherwise the compositional process would break down. Aspectual coercion, on 
the other hand, only involves sortal shifts within the category of events that do not seem 
to affect composition and should therefore best be taken as an instance of semantic 
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underspecifi cation. For a somewhat more differentiated picture on the processing of 
different types of aspectual coercion see Bott (2008a).
7. Conclusion
Although psycholinguistic research on event structure might be said to be still in its 
infancy, the above remarks on some pioneer studies already show that Davidsonian 
events are about to develop into a genuine subject of psychological research on natural 
language. Hidden event arguments, as introduced by Davidson (1967), have not only 
proven to be of great benefi t in explaining numerous combinatorial and inferential 
properties of natural language expressions, such that they show up virtually everywhere 
in present-day assumptions about linguistic structure. In addition, there is growing evi-
dence that they are also psychologically real. Admittedly, we still don’t know for sure 
what kind of things events actually are. Nevertheless, 40 years after they appeared on the 
linguistic scene, Davidsonian events continue to be both an indispensable everyday lin-
guistic instrument and a constant source of fresh insights into the constitution of natural 
language meaning.
8. References
de Almeida, Roberto G. 1999. What do category-specifi c semantic defi cits tell us about the repre-
sentation of lexical concepts? Brain & Language 68, 241–248.
de Almeida, Roberto G. 2004. The effect of context on the processing of type-shifting verbs. Brain 
& Language 90, 249–261.
Asher, Nicholas 2000. Events, facts, propositions, and evolutive anaphora. In: J. Higginbotham, 
F. Pianesi & A. Varzi (eds.). Speaking of Events. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 123–150.
Austin, Jennifer, Stefan Engelberg & Gesa Rauh (eds.) 2004. Adverbials. The Interplay between 
Meaning, Context, and Syntactic Structure. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Bach, Emmon 1986. The algebra of events. Linguistics & Philosophy 9, 5–16.
Bäuerle, Rainer 1994. Zustand – Prozess – Ereignis. Zur Kategorisierung von Verb(al)-phrasen. 
Wuppertaler Arbeitspapiere zur Sprachwissenschaft 10, 1–32.
Bayer, Josef 1986. The role of event expressions in grammar. Studies in Language 10, 1–52.
Bierwisch, Manfred 1988. On the grammar of local prepositions. In: M. Bierwisch, W. Motsch & 
I. Zimmermann (eds.). Syntax, Semantik und Lexikon. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1–65.
Bierwisch, Manfred 1989. Event nominalizations: Proposals and problems. In: W. Motsch (ed.). 
Wortstruktur und Satzstruktur. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1–73.
Bierwisch, Manfred 1997. Lexical information from a minimalist point of view. In: Ch. Wilder, H.-M. 
Gärtner & M. Bierwisch (eds.). The Role of Economy Principles in Linguistic Theory. Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 227–266.
Bierwisch, Manfred 2005. The event structure of CAUSE and BECOME. In: C. Maienborn & A. 
Wöllstein (eds.). Event Arguments: Foundations and Applications. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 11–44.
Bott, Oliver 2008a. The Processing of Events. Doctoral dissertation. University of Tübingen.
Bott, Oliver 2008b. Doing it again and again may be diffi cult, but it depends on what you are doing. 
In: N. Abner & J. Bishop (eds.). Proceedings of the West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics 
(= WCCFL) 27. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Proceedings Project, 63–71.
Brennan, Jonathan & Liina Pylkkänen 2008. Processing events: Behavioral and neuromagnetic cor-
relates of aspectual coercion. Brain & Language 106, 132–143.
Carlson, Gregory N. 1977. Reference to Kinds in English. Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
California, Irvine, CA. Reprinted: New York: Garland, 1980.
826 VII. Theories of sentence semantics
Carlson, Gregory N. 1998. Thematic roles and the individuation of events. In: S. Rothstein (ed.). 
Events and Grammar. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 35–51.
Chierchia, Gennaro 1995. Individual-level predicates as inherent generics. In: G. N. Carlson & F. J. 
Pelletier (eds.). The Generic Book. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 176–223.
Davidson, Donald 1967. The logical form of action sentences. In: N. Resher (ed.). The Logic of 
Decision and Action. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 81–95. Reprinted in: 
D. Davidson (ed.). Essays on Actions and Events.Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 105–122.
Davidson, Donald 1969. The individuation of events. In: N. Resher (ed.). Essays in Honor of Carl 
G. Hempel. Dordrecht: Reidel, 216–234. Reprinted in: D. Davidson (ed.). Essays on Actions and 
Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 163–180.
Diesing, Molly 1992. Indefi nites. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Dölling, Johannes 2003. Flexibility in adverbal modifi cation: Reinterpretation as contextual enrich-
ment. In: E. Lang, C. Maienborn & C. Fabricius-Hansen (eds.). Modifying Adjuncts. Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter, 511–552.
Dölling, Johannes 2005. Copula sentences and entailment relations. Theoretical Linguistics 31, 
317–329.
Dölling, Johannes, Tatjana Heyde-Zybatow & Martin Schäfer (eds.) 2008. Event Structures in Lin-
guistic Form and Interpretation. Berlin: de Gryuter.
Dowty, David R. 1979. Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. The Semantics of Verbs and Times 
in Generative Semantics and in Montague’s PTQ. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Eckardt, Regine 1998. Adverbs, Events and Other Things. Issues in the Semantics of Manner Adverbs. 
Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Eckardt, Regine 2002. Event semantics. In: F. Hamm & T. E. Zimmermann (eds.). Semantics 
(Linguistische Berichte, Sonderheft 10). Hamburg: Buske, 91–128.
Egg, Markus 2003. Beginning novels and fi nishing hamburgers. Remarks on the semantics of ‘to 
begin’. Journal of Semantics 20, 163–191.
Egg, Markus 2005. Flexible Semantics for Reinterpretation Phenomena. Stanford, CA: CSLI 
Publications.
Ehrich, Veronika & Irene Rapp 2000. Sortale Bedeutung und Argumentstruktur: ung-Nominali-
sierungen im Deutschen. Zeitschrift für Sprachwissenschaft 19, 245–303.
Engelberg, Stefan 2000. Verben, Ereignisse und das Lexikon. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Engelberg, Stefan 2002. Intransitive accomplishments and the lexicon: The role of implicit 
arguments, defi niteness, and refl exivity in aspectual composition. Journal of Semantics 19, 
369–416.
Engelberg, Stefan 2005. Stativity, supervenience, and sentential subjects. In: C. Maienborn & 
A. Wöllstein (eds.). Event Arguments: Foundations and Applications. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
45–68.
Fernald, Theodore B. 2000. Predicates and Temporal Arguments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fodor, Janet D., Jerry A. Fodor & Merrill Garrett 1975. The psychological unreality of semantic 
representations. Linguistic Inquiry 6, 515–532.
Fodor, Jerry A. & Ernest LePore 1998. The emptiness of the lexicon: Refl ections on James 
Pustejovsky’s “The Generative Lexicon”. Linguistic Inquiry 29, 269–288.
Geist, Ljudmila 2006. Die Kopula und ihre Komplemente. Zur Kompositionalität in Kopulasätzen. 
Tübingen: Niemeyer.
Gennari, Silvia & David Poeppel 2003. Processing correlates of lexical semantic complexity. Cogni-
tion 89, 27–41.
Glasbey, Sheyla 1997. I-level predicates that allow existential readings for bare plurals. In: 
A. Lawson (ed.). Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (= SALT) VII. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University, 169–179.
Grimshaw, Jane 1990. Argument Structure. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Hamm, Fritz & Michiel van Lambalgen 2005. The Proper Treatment of Events. Oxford: Blackwell.
Härtl, Holden 2008. Implizite Informationen: Sprachliche Ökonomie und interpretative Komplexität 
bei Verben. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
34. Event semantics 827
Higginbotham, James 1983. The logic of perceptual reports: An extensional alternative to situation 
semantics. Journal of Philosophy 80, 100–127.
Higginbotham, James 1985. On semantics. Linguistic Inquiry 16, 547–593.
Higginbotham, James 1989. Elucidations of meaning. Linguistics & Philosophy 12, 465–517.
Higginbotham, James 2000. On events in linguistic semantics. In: J. Higginbotham, F. Pianesi & 
A. Varzi (eds.). Speaking of Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 49–79.
Higginbotham, James 2005. Event positions: Suppression and emergence. Theoretical Linguistics 
31, 349–358.
Higginbotham, James & Gillian Ramchand 1997. The stage-level/individual-level distinction and 
the mapping hypothesis. Oxford University Working Papers in Linguistics, Philology & Pho-
netics 2, 53–83.
Higginbotham, James, Fabio Pianesi & Achille Varzi (eds.) 2000. Speaking of Events. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Jäger, Gerhard 2001. Topic-comment structure and the contrast between stage-level and individual-
level predicates. Journal of Semantics 18, 83–126.
Jäger, Gerhard & Reinhard Blutner 2003. Competition and interpretation: The German adverb 
wieder (‘again’). In: E. Lang, C. Maienborn & C. Fabricius-Hansen (eds.). Modifying Adjuncts. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 393–416.
Kamp, Hans & Uwe Reyle 1993. From Discourse to Logic. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Katz, Graham 2000. Anti Neo-Davidsonianism: Against a Davidsonian semantics for state sen-
tences. In: C. Tenny & J. Pustejovsky (eds.). Events as Grammatical Objects. The Converging 
Perspectives of Lexical Semantics and Syntax. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 393–416.
Katz, Graham 2003. Event arguments, adverb selection, and the Stative Adverb Gap. In: E. Lang, 
C. Maienborn & C. Fabricius-Hansen (eds.). Modifying Adjuncts. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 
455–474.
Katz, Graham 2008. Manner modifi cation of state verbs. In: L. McNally & Ch. Kennedy (eds.). Adjec-
tives and Adverbs. Syntax, Semantics, and Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 220–248.
Kennedy, Christopher & Beth Levin 2008. Measure of change: The adjectival core of degree 
achievements. In: L. McNally & Ch. Kennedy (eds.). Adjectives and Adverbs. Syntax, Semantics, 
and Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 156–182.
Kim, Jaegwon 1969. Events and their descriptions: Some considerations. In: N. Rescher (ed.). Essays 
in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: Reidel, 198–215.
Kim, Jaegwon 1976. Events as property exemplifi cations. In: M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.). Action 
Theory. Proceedings of the Winnipeg Conference on Human Action. Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177.
Kratzer, Angelika 1995. Stage-level and individual-level predicates. In: G. N. Carlson & F. J. Pelletier 
(eds.). The Generic Book. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 125–175.
Krifka, Manfred 1989. Nominal reference, temporal constitution and quantifi cation in event seman-
tics. In: R. Bartsch, J. van Benthem & P. van Emde Boas (eds.). Semantics and Contextual Expres-
sion. Dordrecht: Foris, 75–115.
Krifka, Manfred 1990. Four thousand ships passed through the lock: Object-induced measure func-
tions on events. Linguistics & Philosophy 13, 487–520.
Krifka, Manfred 1992. Thematic relations as links between nominal reference and temporal consti-
tution. In: I. Sag & A. Szabolcsi (eds.). Lexical Matters. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 29–53.
Krifka, Manfred 1998. The origins of telicity. In: S. Rothstein (ed.). Events and Grammar. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 197–235.
Ladusaw, William 1994. Thetic and categorical, stage and individual, weak and strong. In: M. Harvey 
& L. Santelmann (eds.). Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (= SALT) IV. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University, 220–229.
Lang, Ewald, Claudia Maienborn & Cathrine Fabricius-Hansen (eds.) 2003. Modifying Adjuncts. 
Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
Lemmon, Edward J. 1967. Comments on D. Davidson’s “The Logical Form of Action Sentences”. 
In: N. Resher (ed.). The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 96–103.
828 VII. Theories of sentence semantics
LePore, Ernest 1985. The semantics of action, event, and singular causal sentences. In: E. LePore & 
B. McLaughlin (eds.). Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 151–161.
Levin, Beth & Malka Rappaport Hovav 1995. Unaccusativity: At the Syntax-Lexical Semantics 
Interface. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Lombard, Lawrence B. 1998. Ontologies of events. In: S. Laurence & C. Macdonald (eds.). Contem-
porary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell, 277–294.
Magri, Giorgio. 2008. A Theory of Individual-level Predicates Based on Blind Scalar Implicatures 
(Extended version). Ms. Cambridge, MA, MIT. http://web.mit.edu/gmagri/www/. December 11, 
2010.
Magri, Giorgio 2009. A theory of individual-level predicates based on blind mandatory scalar impli-
catures. Natural Language Semantics 17, 245–297.
Maienborn, Claudia 2001. On the position and interpretation of locative modifi ers. Natural Lan-
guage Semantics 9, 191–240.
Maienborn, Claudia 2003. Die logische Form von Kopula-Sätzen. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Maienborn, Claudia 2004. A pragmatic explanation of the stage-level/individual-level contrast in 
combination with locatives. In: B. Agbayani, V. Samiian & B. Tucker (eds.). Proceedings of the 
Western Conference on Linguistics (= WECOL) 15. Fresno, CA: CSU, 158–170.
Maienborn, Claudia 2005a. On the limits of the Davidsonian approach: The case of copula sen-
tences. Theoretical Linguistics 31, 275–316.
Maienborn, Claudia 2005b. Eventualities and different things: A reply. Theoretical Linguistics 31, 
383–396.
Maienborn, Claudia 2005c. A discourse-based account of Spanish ‘ser/estar’. Linguistics 43, 155–180.
Maienborn, Claudia 2007. On Davidsonian and Kimian states. In: I. Comorovski & K. von 
Heusinger (eds.). Existence: Semantics and Syntax. Dordrecht: Springer, 107–130.
Maienborn, Claudia & Angelika Wöllstein (eds.) 2005. Event Arguments: Foundations and Applica-
tions. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
McKoon, Gail & Talke Macfarland 2000. Externally and internally caused change of state verbs. 
Language 76, 833–858.
McKoon, Gail & Talke Macfarland 2002. Event templates in the lexical representations of verbs. 
Cognitive Psychology 45, 1–44.
McNally, Louise 1998. Stativity and theticity. In: S. Rothstein (ed.). Events and Grammar. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 293–307.
Milsark, Gary L. 1974. Existential Sentences in English. Ph.D. dissertation. MIT, Cambridge, MA. 
Reprinted: Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1976.
Milsark, Gary L. 1977.  Toward an explanation of certain peculiarities of the existential construction 
in English. Linguistic Analysis 3, 1–29.
Mittwoch, Anita 2005. Do states have Davidsonian arguments? Some empirical considerations. In: 
C. Maienborn & Angelika Wöllstein (eds.). Event Arguments: Foundations and Applications.
Tübingen: Niemeyer, 69–88.
Mobayyen, Forouzan & Roberto G. de Almeida 2005. The infl uence of semantic and morphological 
complexity of verbs on sentence recall: Implications for the nature of conceptual representation 
and category-specifi c defi cits. Brain and Cognition 57, 168–171.
Moens, Marc & Mark Steedman 1988. Temporal ontology and temporal reference. Computational 
Linguistics 14, 15–28.
Parsons, Terence 1990. Events in the Semantics of English. A Study in Subatomic Semantics. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Parsons, Terence 1995. Thematic relations and arguments. Linguistic Inquiry 26, 635–662.
Parsons, Terence 2000. Underlying states and time travel. In: J. Higginbotham, F. Pianesi & A. Varzi 
(eds.). Speaking of Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 81–93.
Pianesi, Fabio & Achille C. Varzi 2000. Events and event talk: An introduction. In: J. Higginbotham, 
F. Pianesi & A. Varzi (eds.). Speaking of Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–47.
34. Event semantics 829
Pickering, Martin J., Brian McElree & Matthew J. Traxler 2005. The diffi culty of coercion: A 
response to de Almeida. Brain & Language 93, 1–9.
Pickering, Martin J., Brian McElree, Steven Frisson, Lillian Chen & Matthew J. Traxler 2006. Under-
specifi cation and aspectual coercion. Discourse Processes 42, 131–155.
Piñango, Maria M., Jennifer Mack & Ray Jackendoff (to appear). Semantic combinatorial pro-
cesses in argument structure: Evidence from light-verbs. In: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 
of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (= BLS) 32.
Piñango, Maria M., Edgar Zurif & Ray Jackendoff 1999. Real-time processing implications of 
enriched composition at the syntax-semantics interface. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 
28, 395–414.
Piñón, Christopher 1997. Achievements in an event semantics. In: A. Lawson & E. Cho (eds.). 
Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (= SALT) VII. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 
276–293.
Pulman, Stephen G. 1997. Aspectual shift as type coercion. Transactions of the Philological Society 
95, 279–317.
Pustejovsky, James 1991. The syntax of event structure. Cognition 41, 47–81.
Pustejovsky, James 1995. The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Pylkkänen, Liina & Brian McElree 2006. The syntax-semantics interface: On-line composition of 
meaning. In: M. A. Gernsbacher & M. Traxler (eds.). Handbook of Psycholinguistics. 2nd edn. 
New York: Elsevier, 537–577.
Ramchand, Gillian 1996. Two subject positions in Scottish Gaelic: The syntax-semantics interface. 
Natural Language Semantics 4, 165–191.
Ramchand, Gillian 2005. Post-Davidsonianism. Theoretical Linguistics 31, 359–373.
Rapp, Irene 2007. „Was den Besuch zum Ereignis macht“ – eine outputorientierte Analyse für die 
Verb-Nomen-Konversion im Deutschen. Linguistische Berichte 208, 407–437.
Reichenbach, Hans 1947. Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York: Macmillan.
Rothmayr, Antonia 2009. The Structure of Stative Verbs. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Rothstein, Susan (ed.) 1998. Events and Grammar. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Rothstein, Susan 2004. Structuring Events: A Study in the Semantics of Lexical Aspect. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Rothstein, Susan 2005. States and modifi cation: A reply to Maienborn. Theoretical Linguistics 31, 
375–381.
Sæbø, Kjell Johan 2008. The structure of criterion predicates. In: J. Dölling, T. Heyde-Zybatow
& M. Schäfer (eds.). Event Structures in Linguistic Form and Interpretation. Berlin: de Gruyter, 
127–147.
von Stechow, Arnim 1996. The different readings of wieder ‘again’: A structural account. Journal of 
Semantics 13, 87–138.
von Stechow, Arnim 2003. How are results represented and modifi ed? Remarks on Jäger & 
Blutner’s anti-decomposition. In: E. Lang, C. Maienborn & C. Fabricius-Hansen (eds.). Modi-
fying Adjuncts. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 417–451.
de Swart, Henriëtte 1998. Aspect shift and coercion. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 16, 
347–385.
Tenny, Carol & James Pustejovsky (eds.) 2000. Events as Grammatical Objects. The Converging 
Perspectives of Lexical Semantics and Syntax. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
Thomason, Richmond H. & Robert C. Stalnaker 1973. A semantic theory of adverbs. Linguistic 
Inquiry 4, 195–220.
Traxler, Matthew J., Brian McElree, Rihana S. Williams & Martin J. Pickering 2005. Context effects 
in coercion: Evidence from eye movements. Journal of Memory and Language 53, 1–25.
Vendler, Zeno 1967. Linguistics in Philosophy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wunderlich, Dieter 1997. CAUSE and the structure of verbs. Linguistic Inquiry 28, 27–68.
Zucchi, Alessandro 1993. The Language of Propositions and Events. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Claudia Maienborn, Tübingen (Germany)
